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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a model which simulates odds distributions of pari-
mutuel betting system under two hypotheses on the behavior of bettors: 1.
The amount of bets increases very rapidly as the deadline for betting comes
near. 2. Each bettor bets on a horse which gives the largest expectation value
of the benefit. The results can be interpreted as such efficient behaviors do
not serve to extinguish the FL bias but even produce stronger FL bias.
Keywords: pari-mutuel system, time series of odds, FL bias, market
efficiency, horse-racing
1. History and Motivation
The market efficiency hypothesis has been one of the most argued subjects
in Economics ([1, 2] for standard references). It claims that if an arbitrage
occurs in a market, news of this will spread so rapidly that on average people
are unable to benefit. This notion has also been applied to the study of
Pari-mutuel betting systems in the late 1900’s. For example, if a horse wins
too often in relation to its odds, it quickly becomes well known and people
begin to bet more money on it. Hence, we may well expect its odds to
decrease rapidly, to the point where there is no more benefit in betting on
this horse compared to any other. However, this is not always the case in
real horse racing. It has been reported that expectation values of the benefit
of betting on the favorites tend to be higher than the perceived benefit of
betting on longshots ([3] for the first report). This is called favorite-longshot
(FL) bias. It should be noted here that the weak form of market efficiency
is still observed under the bias. In other word, although the rate of return
for favorites is large, it does not exceed one.
After the report [3], FL bias has been observed in many races all over the
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world. It is also notable that inverse FL bias, i.e. a phenomenon that rate
of return for longshots becomes higher than that for favorites, was observed
in several parimutuel systems other than horse racing [4]. In both FL and
inverse FL bias, what is theoretically important is that the rates of return are
different in favorites and longshots. This has been one of the central subjects
in the study of the pari-mutuel betting system. Many preceding studies
attempted to explain such bias by assuming the existence of non-efficient
bettors. In [5, 6], for example, the bias is explained as an equilibrium of
powers between two groups, one of which is constituted of efficient bettors
while the other puts an importance on pursuing the leisure or thrill of betting.
There also many studies which explain the bias in terms of misperception of
the true underlying probabilities for winning [7, 8]. If the existence of non-
efficient bettors or misperception of probabilities account for the bias, the
next question will be how and why the ratio of such bettors or misperceptions
are determined so coincidentally as to produce the real distribution of odds
with weak efficiency being a possibility. Before going to this stage, this study
simulates what will happen if all the betters behave efficiently. The result
suggests that the FL bias occurs even if all the bettors behave to maximize
their expectation values of their bets. The bettors in the model bet their
money on horses whose odds are large in relation to their probabilities of
winning. And the odds fluctuate over time with such bets until the race
begins. Conditions for the simulations will vary in several ways. We will
change how efficiently bettors behave. It will also be changed how strong
favorites are in a race. We will then change how rapidly bets accumulate
over time.
It should be noted here that there are already some studies which explain
FL bias by considering how odds tables are driven by wagering over time.
Some of the most successful examples will be Ali [9], Blough [10], Brown and
Lin [11]. In their studies, bettors hold heterogeneous subjective probabilities
about the true winning probability of each horse. Contrary to that, in our
model, the beliefs of bettors are homogeneous. But the attitudes for efficiency
fluctuate randomly. According to our results, FL bias is even amplified when
bettors behave too efficiently.
2. Modeling
Let us consider the win betting system in a race consists of N horses.
We denote the ratio of the amount of bets for the i-th horse to that of all
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horses at time t as Vi(t). In pari-mutuel betting system, the odds for this
horse is (1− α)/Vi(t), where the constant α is the rate of track take fixed in
each racetrack. Since Vi(t) varies over time, the odds table also varies over
time. In most racetracks, odds tables changes at one or two minute intervals.
And, the change of the odds table becomes one of major reasons to promotes
changes in Vi(t) because people make their decisions based on the odds table.
According to this mechanism, Vi(t) changes over time until the race starts.
These are, at this time, the general setting of the pari-mutuel system. Now
we introduce a positive constant pi, which represents a rational value of Vi(t).
And we regard pi/Vi(t) to represents how much it is efficient to bet on i-th
horse. That is to say, the larger pi/Vi , the more the i-th horse appealing
to efficient bettors. If the track take is zero, pi can be regarded as the true
probability that i-th horse wins, then, pi/Vi is nothing but the rate of return
of betting on i-th horse. One might wonder that, if it were roulette, bettors
are in advance informed of the probability that each number will come up.
But, in the case of horse racing, people do not know any such exact values
to judge the efficiency beforehand. More precise explanations on this issue
will be given in section 2.3. Another remarkable tendency of efficient bettors
is that they like to put off their bets for as long as possible. To reflect this
pattern, our model only deals with the time evolution of bets in the last 20
minutes before races start. Thus, we arrive at the following model.
1. Let t (t = −20,−19, · · · , 0[min]) denotes time after a race starts. The
total amount of minimum unit of bets in each race is fixed to be 200,000.
And the rate of bets finished before time t will be denoted as F (t).
Hence, F (0) = 1 is assumed. We will also use f(t) = F (t) − F (t − 1)
to represent the rate of bets which are accumulated between t− 1 and
t.
2. The number of horses in each race is fixed to be N . And each horse
equips a constant which will be referred to as consensus probability
pi (i = 1, 2, · · · , N) [10]. We assume p1 + p2 + · · · + pN = 1 and
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ · · · ≥ pN for convenience.
3. At time t, the all N horses are sorted according to the magnitude of
pi/Vi(t). Then we introduce a probability qn with which a bet is made
on a horse having the n-th largest magnitude. {qn}n=1,2,···,N will be
denoted as the preference probability distribution, where q1+q2+ · · ·+
qN = 1 and q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · ≥ qN are assumed.
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Figure 1: an average of F (t) in HK racetrack and exponential fittings.
Now we proceed to choose the parameters of this model.
2.1. The shape of F (t)
If the bettors are genuinely efficient, they will not make any bet until the
last minute before each race starts. For example, [12] reports that 40% of
the total bets rash to the last few minutes before a race starts. According to
this idea, the most suitable distribution is a delta function, i.e. f(t) takes
positive value only when t = 1 and f(t) = 0 otherwise. But, in reality,
“the last minute” can be different from bettor to bettor. So there must be
a fluctuation from the delta function. Here we exhibit an example of F (t)
in a real race track in FIG. 1. The real line represents the average F (t) in
the HongKong racetrack [13] in the period from October 2012 to May 2014,
where the average is taken over entire 2000 races during the period. The
horizontal axis represents the time t. It should be noted here that numbers
of bettors in real data change until t = 2 or 3 probably because of a lag of
publication. The regression curve of dotted line is of the form exp(c0 + c1t)
and the dashed one exp(c0+c1t+c2t
2+c3t
3). It would be an interesting future
study to investigate the mechanism that generates the shape of F (t). Instead
of sticking to the exact shape, in this paper, we will change f(t) in several
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ways. As for the speed of growth, we will try exponential growth, constant
growth and exponential decay. Another important factor is the initial value
F (−20) . We will consider F (−20) = 0.35 and 0.01. Up to Section 5, we only
deal with exponentially growing f(t) with F (−20) = 0.35, which gives the
nearest shape for HK data in Fig.1. Henceforth in this paper the HongKong
data will be regarded as standard for setting parameters.
It should be noted that very few pari-mutuel racetracks disclose data on F (t).
And the HongKong racetrack is one of the most notable examples of world
famous racetracks which openly disclose their data on F (t).
2.2. Choice of N
We set as N = 14. This is not only because the number of horses in a
HongKong race is 14, but also because most races in the world are held with
10 to 16 horses.
2.3. Choice of consensus probability
As stated in the rule, we associated the consensus probability pi with each
horse. This might seem strange because people do not know the probability
that each horse will win. However, each bettor must possesses his/her own
valuation on each horse and the average of these valuations must exist as pi.
Since it is just an average, it can differ from valuations of individual betters.
And the belief in pi can fluctuate from time to time. The value of pi itself
might also fluctuate over time. In this paper, we take a viewpoint that such
variance and fluctuation in pi are rounded to choice of preference distribution
{qn} . Thus, we set,
pi = Ca exp (−ai) (1)
where Ca is the normalization constant to make
∑14
j=1 pj = 1 hold. We
carried out the simulations with a = 0.05, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 1.3. Judging from the
frequency of winning of favorites in the data, a is estimated to be 0.3 ∼ 0.5
in real HongKong races.
2.4. Choice of preference probability
As for qn, the only assumption one can naturally make is that qn decreases
with n. To make variety of qn wide enough, we use the following function.
qn = Db
(
15− n
14
)b
(2)
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Figure 2: Shapes of {pi} for various values of a.
where Db is a normalization constant which make
∑14
j=1 qj = 1 hold. We set
b = 1/400, 1/54, 1/20, 1/7, 1/4, 1/2, 1, 2, 4, 7, 20, 54, 400. The shape of {qn}
for these values of b are listed in FIG. 3.
3. Results of simulations
We carried out 2000 simulations for each set of parameters. The source
cords and HongKong data of F (t) are kept at
https://github.com/qurihara/EconomicSimulation.
3.1. Preference distribution and FL bias
We first present a result of the case a = 0.3 in FIG.4. The accumulation
of bets is exponentially growing type and initial rate of bets F (−20) is set
to be 0.35. In FIG.4, b = 400 implies that all the bettors bet their money on
the most beneficial horse. While, the almost uniform distribution, b = 1/400,
implies all the bettors bet their money on a randomly chosen horse regardless
whether the horse is beneficial or not. It is not surprising that a FL bias
appeared in the latter case, because people bet their money on longshots in
equal probability as on favorites. It is truly astonishing that a strong FL
bias is formed in b = 400 case. The bias seems weakest around b = 4. Seeing
FIG.4, it is sufficient to compare V1 with p1 to measure the bias. Hence, in
FIG.5, Vi(0)/pi for i = 1, 2, 3 are exhibited, i.e., for top 3 favorites. In this
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Figure 3: Shapes of {qn} for various values of b.
Figure 4: popularity rank and rate of bets compared to consensus probabilities
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Figure 5: Vi(0)/pi for top 3 favorites.
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Figure 6: How FL bias depends on consensus distributions.
figure, V/p < 1 means FL bias. The result suggests that there exists a value
of b which maximize Vi/pi. The simulation claims that FL bias occurs even
if all the betters behave efficiently. Moreover, it claims that a bias can even
be weakened when there is proper amount of inefficient betters.
3.2. Uniformness of consensus distribution and FL bias
Now, it is natural to change consensus distribution because bias can not
happen when neither favorite nor longshot exists, i.e., consensus probability
distribution is uniform. The bias must depend on how much stronger fa-
vorites are than longshots. Seeing the equation (1), the distribution tends
to uniform distribution when a goes to 0. While, as a becomes greater than
0, the favorite becomes stronger. FIG.6 represents results of simulations for
a = 0.05, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 1.3. As the result shows, basically, the more out-
staning the favorite, the stronger the bias becomes. Another notable feature
is how the bias depends on preference distribution. Every time we fix a,
there exists a value of b which best weaken the FL bias. And such b becomes
greater as a becomes greater. That is to say, the stronger the favorite be-
comes, the more we should bet efficiently to eliminate the FL bias. But bias
does not disappear regardless. And yet another mystery is that the bias is
again enforced when b exceed the best value.
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abbreviation growth of f(t) pre-bettors expression of F (t)
0.35-growth exponential growth 35% 0.35−t/20
0.35-linear linear growth 35% 0.0325t+1
0.35-decay exponential decay 35% 1.35− 0.351+t/20
0.01-growth exponential growth 1% 0.01−t/20
0.01-linear linear growth 1% 0.0495t+1
0.01-decay exponential decay 1% 1.01− 0.011+t/20
Table 1: models for f(t).
3.3. Rapidity of accumulation of betting and FL bias
Since FL bias is a kind of over/under-estimation, it must depend on the
amount of bettors who are making estimations at time t. Hence, in this
section, we will change the time dependence of the number of bettors. We
introduced two viewpoints in section 2.1. First, we change the percentage
of what we call pre-bettors, i.e., the bettors already finished their bets more
than 20 minutes before a race start. In real Hong-Kong races, a typical
percentage of pre-bettors is 35%. But it is apparent that a percentage of
pre-bettors has a large effect on the final distribution of bettors. Hence we
not only examined 35%, but also a condition that the percentage of pre-
bettors is very small, i.e., 1%. In both cases, we made the odds distributions
of pre-bettors correspond to consensus probability distribution with a certain
amount of random fluctuation. Second of all, we changed the rapidity of the
growth of the numbers of bettors during the last 20 minutes. We examined
exponential growth, linear growth and exponential decay. In all, we examined
2 × 3 = 6 models for the growth of numbers of bettors. The mathematical
expression for each model becomes unique due to the conditions F (0) = 1
and F(-20)=0.35 (or 0.01).
FIG.7 represents how FL bias depends on the rapidity of growth of bettors.
The vertical axis again represents V1/P1. The parameter a is set to be 0.3. As
is shown, FL bias appears more radically when the percentage of pre-bettors
is 0.01. Now we have to be mindful that the pre-bettors bet in accordance
with the consensus probability distribution. This might partially explain why
V1/p1 becomes higher for 1% case than for 35% case. Another outstanding
feature is that the bias is strongest in 0.01-deay model. We do not yet know
any quantitative explanation for these result.
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Figure 7: How V/p changes with f(t)
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4. Discussion and future works
The model in this paper assumes that each bettor behaves to make Vi
near to pi. However, Vi becomes greater than pi for longshots and smaller
for favorites. This can be interpreted as a FL bias. Since it is a purely
statistical model with homogeneous bettors, the reason for this bias should
exist in macro-micro interaction, i.e., sorting of horses. We believe it is
interesting that such simple and uniform rules in micro behavior result in
unexpected macro statistics. It is also observed that the strength of bias de-
pends on consensus probability distributions and how bets accumulate over
time. The more favorites outstand, the more bias get stronger. The bias
becomes stronger if f(t) has points where it increases rapidly. Qualitatively
speaking, a minimum unit of bet for longshots makes a larger dispropor-
tionate effect on odds distribution than for favorites because the number of
bettors in longshots is smaller than those in favorites. For example, assume
that the number of bettors for longshots is 1 and for favorites 10. Then,
V for longshots is 1/11 and favorites 10/11. Now assume that one bet is
added to longshots. Then, V for longshots becomes 2/12. If it is added to
favorites, V becomes 11/12. In this example, it is apparent that the change
in V is much greater in longshots. But we yet do not know whether this
explains our results enough. Due to the sorting process, it is difficult to give
mathematical analysis. Probably, analysing N = 2 case will be a first future
work. A master equation for N = 2 case is exhibited in Appendix.
Another branch for this study is that it can serve to analyze real systems sim-
ilar to pari-mutuel system. For example, it simulates games such as roulette
and baccarat where consensus distributions are disclosed to bettors. Another
type of application is for growth of queues at counters in shops or gates on
highways. In these settings bettors are interpreted as customers. each cus-
tomer choose a queue to join, judging from the consensus length of the queue.
Favorites now implies counters or gates which have shorter consensus length.
In the field of stochastic process, our model is a kind of anomalous walk
where the drifts can vary depending on the position of walkers.
In terms of pari-mutuel betting systems, the most necessary modification for
the model will be to introduce a track take. In real horse races, efficient
bettors will bet their money only when the benefit is positive even if the
track take is considered. That probably means we should set a threshold for
betting in terms of Vi/pi.
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Appendix A. Master equation for N = 2 case
Let P (·, t) denote the probability density function for V1(t). Then, the
state k < V1(t) < k + dk occurs with the probability P (k, t)dk. The aim of
this appendix is to show that the below is the time evolution equation of
P (k, t) for N = 2 case.
P (k, t) =
∫ p
−∞
P (s, t− 1)φ
(
k − s; (s− q)f(t)
F (t)
,
qqf(t)
mF (t)2
)
ds
+
∫ ∞
p
P (s, t− 1)φ
(
k − s; (s− q)f(t)
F (t)
,
qqf(t)
mF (t)2
)
ds. (A.1)
φ(x; µ, σ2) =
1√
2piσ
exp
(
−(x− µ)
2
2σ2
)
Here, we defined q = q1, q = q2(= 1 − q) and p = p1 for simplicity. m is
the total number of bets in a race fixed as 200,000 in this paper. φ(· ;µ, σ2)
is the probability density function for N(µ, σ2), the normal distribution with
the average µ and variance σ2.
First notice for deriving (A.1) is that, if V1(t−1) < p, the amount of bets ac-
cumulating to the favorite at time t yields B(mf(t), q). Here, B(n, r) denotes
the binomial distribution with n being total number of experiments and r
the probability of a successful result. Then, since mf(t) is large, B(mf(t), q)
is approximated by N(mqf(t), mqqf(t)). Then, we interpret this observation
in terms of V1(t). Suppose V1(t− 1) increases from y to y + z at time t, i.e.
V1(t) = y + z. This implies that m(zF (t) − yf(t)) bets are made at time t.
Hence, the increment z yields N((y − q)f(t)/F (t), f(t)qq/mF (t)2). We can
analyse the V1(t − 1) ≥ p case in the same manner. In this case, z yields
N((y − q)f(t)/F (t), f(t)qq/mF (t)2).
Now, we proceed to consider a recurrence equation for P (k, t). One way to
reach the state V1(t) = k is that V1 increases by k − s after V1(t − 1) = s
occurred. The probability density of this is a multiple
P (s, t− 1) · φ
(
k − s; (s− q)f(t)
F (t)
,
qqf(t)
mF (t)2
)
,
if s is less than p. The r.h.s. of the equation (A.1) is nothing but an integra-
tion of such multiples for various values of s.
13
Appendix B. References
References
[1] L. Bachelier, ‘The´orie de la speculation’, Paris: Gautier-Villars, reprinted
in English in P. Cootner (ed.) ‘The Random Character of Stock Market
Prices’, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (1964)
[2] E. F. Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets II’ Journal of Finance 46 (5) (1991)
pp 1575-1617.
[3] R. M. Griffith, ‘Odds Adjustments by American Horse-Race Bettors’,
American Journal of Economic Psychology, 62 (1949) pp 290-294.
[4] R. S. Sobel and M. E. Ryan, ‘Unifying the Favorite-Longshot Bias with
Other Market Anomalies’ in D B Hausch and W T Ziemba (ed) Hand-
book of Sports and Lottery Markets (Handbooks in Finance) (Elsevier,
Amsterdam , NL, 2008) pp 137-160.
[5] L. Coleman, New light on the longshot bias , Applied Economics 36 (2004)
pp 315-326.
[6] A. C. Bruce and J. E. V Johnson, Toward an Explanation of Betting as
a Leisure Pursuit , Leisure Studies 11 (1992) pp 201-218.
[7] S. Chad and R. E. Quandt ‘Betting Bias and Market Equilibrium in
Racetrack Betting’ , Applied Financial Economics 6 (3) (1996) pp 287-
292.
[8] R. Thaler and W. Ziemba, Parimutuel Betting Markets: Racetracks and
Lotteries , Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (1988) pp 161-174.
[9] M. M. Ali, ‘Probability and utility estimates for racetrack bettors’ , Jour-
nal of Political Economics 84 (1977) pp.803-815.
[10] S. Blough, ‘Differences of opinions at the racetrack’ . In: Hausch, D., Lo,
V., Ziemba, W. (Eds.), Efficiency of Racetrack Betting Markets, (1994)
pp. 323-341.
[11] R. D. Brown and Y. Lin ‘Racetrack betting and consensus of subjective
probabilities’ , Statistics & Probability Letters 62 (2003) pp.175-187.
14
[12] M. Gramm and C. N. Mckinney The effect of late money on betting
market efficiency , Applied Economics Letters 16 (4) (2009) pp. 369-72
[13] The URL of HongKong racetracks,
http://www.hkjc.com/home/english/index.aspx
15
